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Abstract- The article discusses the supply chain 
strategies of the so-termed Arctic Five – the Russian 
Federation, Canada, the USA, Norway and Denmark, 
which have borders in the Arctic in the context of the 
search for their common goals and objectives in order 
to develop possible ways and means to solve the main 
common problem – the territory delimitation in the 
Arctic between these countries. Much has been 
written about the legal methods of maritime 
delimitation in the Arctic, but their essence is to 
compare the principles of “Sectoral division” in the 
Arctic with the norms of the 1982 “United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”. Meanwhile, the 
current international situation and the current state 
of the Arctic countries in relation to each other in the 
sphere of military power, economy, science and 
climate change in the Arctic, force us to consider the 
issue of territory delimitation in the Arctic in an 
extensive aspect.  
Keywords- supply chain strategy, policy, the Arctic, the 
Arctic countries, delimitation, problems, law. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Arctic is the northern polar region of the Earth, 
including the continental margins of Eurasia and 
North America, almost the entire Arctic Ocean with 
islands, except for the coastal islands of Norway, as 
well as the adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.  The most remarkable fact is that the 
Arctic, occupying one sixth of the Earth, is still the 
only large territory without a clear international 
legal status (regime) and with many available 
territorial disputes between the Arctic countries. 
Therefore, the Arctic territories should be given a 
legal status, which would be similar to the status of 
Antarctica, noting the need to sign an International 
Treaty that will be modelled on the Madrid 
Protocol on environmental protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1998 [1, 2]. However, some 
experts believe that besides areas under national 
jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic region 
includes such territories and maritime areas that are 
“beyond national jurisdiction as well as several 
areas of contested jurisdiction”. According to 
geologists, the Arctic region of the planet is the 
world’s largest circumpolar mineragenic belt that is 
replete with oil and gas and ore deposits. A 
significant part of hydrocarbons is produced here 
already today, and the potential reserves of oil and 
gas fields are estimated at almost a quarter of the 
world’s forecast resources [24, 25]. In this regard, 
all Arctic countries have strengthened and 
repeatedly increased their scientific sea expeditions 
in the Arctic and their presence in their polar 
territories in recent years. The main objective of 
scientific researches in the Arctic is to gather the 
necessary evidence to establish the boundaries of 
the special exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf in the Arctic, which are potential 
sources of large deposits of natural resources. At 
the same time, the approximate boundaries of the 
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves 
of the Arctic countries touch each other, which 
causes territorial disputes. Currently, all the Arctic 
countries have territorial disputes among 
themselves, which have not been settled until now 
and are unlikely to be settled in the next decade. 
This is primarily explained by the fact that the 
geological structure of the bottom of the Arctic 
Ocean is very complex, and its research is 
extremely difficult and costly due to climatic 
conditions. The second factor is the international 
mechanisms of legal regulation, in particular the 
work of the UN Commission on the Continental 
Shelf, which is designed to settle territorial disputes 
and considers such disputes for years. In this 
regard, there is a need to consider the goals and 
objectives of the Arctic countries in their Arctic 
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territories in search for mutually acceptable and 
joint actions to solve joint problems and joint 
activities in this region, which ultimately will not 
only accelerate the resolution of delimitation issues, 
but also will help determine the legal regime of the 
Arctic. 
 
2. Methodology  
The methodological framework of the study is the 
dialectical method of reality cognition in its 
connection and interaction. The authors used 
general scientific and special methods (systemic 
and historical method, method of analysis and 
synthesis); specific scientific methods (systematic 
research method, problem-chronological method); 
theoretical methods followed by the analysis and 
generalization of the results (statistical and 
empirical methods, observation and comparison), 
and also particular scientific methods, such as a 
comparative legal, technical-legal, formal-logical 
ones in their various combinations in the research 
process.  
 
3. Results and discussion  
3.1. Canada’s arctic strategy  
Canada ranks the second after Russia in the world 
in its length of the Arctic coast. In terms of the 
development of its Arctic territories (fishing, 
mining, creation of new sea routes, population, 
military presence, etc.), Canada is to some extent 
lagging behind its Arctic neighbors. However 
Canada is the first country that has declared 
sovereignty over a certain part of the Arctic at the 
legislative level and gave a “start” to the so-termed 
principle of “Sectoral division of the Arctic”, 
having begun to form a political mechanism to 
ensure its national and state interests in the Arctic 
[3]. Thus, in 1904 the Department of Internal 
Affairs of Canada published a map of Canada in 
which the Western and Eastern borders of Canada 
were shown at the meridians 60° and 141° W, 
which passes through the Eastern and Western ends 
of the coast facing the Arctic Ocean. The Northwest 
Territories Act was adopted in 1907 in order to 
consolidate Canada’s rights to its Arctic sector. In 
1909, a Canadian Senator Poirier made a public 
statement that the Arctic basin is a special systemic 
whole – a vast semicircle, which is a natural 
extension of the Arctic States’ territory, and 
therefore it is logical to consider all the lands and 
islands of the Arctic system as a part of the coastal 
countries and divide them between these countries. 
It is customary to associate the birth of the “sectoral 
theory” with this date and with the name of this 
Senator. In 1925, amendments were made to the 
Northwest Territories Act, under which Canada 
established that activities within the Canadian 
Arctic sector, including for the exploration and 
development of natural resources, required the 
appropriate permits of Canadian authorities. A 
Royal decree was issued in 1926, in addition to the 
Northwest Territories Act, which established the 
rule that foreign nationals wishing to visit the land 
areas adjacent to the Canadian coast in the Arctic 
must first obtain permission from the Canadian 
authorities. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, Canada not only launched the sectoral 
principle in the territory delimitation in the Arctic, 
which later became a norm of customary 
international law, but also for the first time defined 
its strategy in the Arctic. It was to consolidate 
Canada’s jurisdiction over the vast northern 
territories up to the North Pole. In fact, Canada 
unilaterally established its state borders in the 
Arctic. The main objective of this strategy was to 
take possession of the territory and extend its 
jurisdiction over it, setting its own boundaries. 
Moreover, Canada, through Senator Poirier in 
1909, invited other Arctic countries to follow its 
example and divide the Arctic basin into sectors, 
thereby giving legitimacy and international 
recognition to own actions.  The Russian Empire, 
later the Soviet Union, followed the example of 
Canada, and the Notes of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Empire dated September 4, 
1916, a Decree of the Council of People’s 
Commissars of 1921, a Memorandum of People’s 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR 
dated October 04, 1924, and the Decree of the 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated April 
15, 1926 consolidated the Russian sector in the 
Arctic. In fact, Canada and the USSR acted in the 
Arctic in the early twentieth century almost the 
same with respect to the territory delimitation in the 
Arctic and surprisingly, they did not have territorial 
disputes. The strategies of both countries also had 
common features and were aimed at the protection 
of sovereign rights, regulation of fisheries and 
navigation in the waters related to their sectors. 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, Canada’s 
strategy in the Arctic has not changed much. Of 
course, military security became a priority, but it 
was more of a “declarative” nature than actually 
carried out actions. This was determined by the fact 
that there were no direct military threats in the 
Arctic region for Canada, as there are none to this 
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day. Canada, which is in close contact with the US 
and NATO, relied heavily on the US military 
power. With the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, 
Canada’s strategy began to finally lean towards 
sustainable socio-economic development of the 
northern territories and environmental 
development. Since the early 2000s, Canada has 
been developing a doctrinal framework for its 
policy in the Arctic. In 2002, a document entitled 
The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign 
Policy was adopted, providing for a series of 
government measures to ensure international 
cooperation in the Arctic. In 2008, the Canada 
First Defense Strategy was unveiled, with a 
significant focus on the Arctic issues. For the first 
time, the Ottawa Arctic Doctrine was set out in a 
systematic form in the official document, Canada’s 
Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future, published in 2009 [4]. If we generalize the 
Northern Strategy of Canada in the most general 
way, it is divided into internal and external parts, 
with the internal part being considered the main 
part, and therefore the current Arctic Strategy of 
Canada has an internal rather than external 
orientation. The main meaning of the internal part 
is reduced to the integrated development of the 
northern territories of Canada. And this is 
understandable, since according to preliminary 
data, there are huge reserves of not only oil and gas 
in the coastal zone of the Canadian Arctic, but also 
of such minerals as methane hydrate, diamonds, 
copper, zinc, mercury, gold, rare earth metals, and 
uranium, not to mention bio resources [5]. In this 
regard, the internal part of The Northern Strategy of 
Canada refers to the establishment of an 
appropriate legislative, socio-economic, research 
and institutional framework for the management of 
the Canadian northern territories. The external part 
of The Northern Strategy of Canada includes three 
main aspects:  
 settlement of territorial disputes with 
neighboring countries;  
 expansion of the exclusive economic zone 
through the increment of the continental shelf in the 
Arctic;  
 Development of multilateral cooperation 
mechanism in the region, including improvement 
of security system aimed to protect against natural 
and manmade hazards. 
From the above aspects, it is clear that Canada does 
not intend to militarize its part of the Arctic in any 
form, except for the establishment of several 
seaports and the strengthening of the coast guard. 
Canadian military authorities continue to adhere to 
their early concept of relying on the US military 
power. This concept is the most advantageous in 
financial and functional terms, as in the years of the 
Cold War, as Canada has neither the desire nor the 
logistical capacity to get involved in the event of a 
large-scale military conflict [6]. The Northern 
Strategy of Canada in its current form is more than 
attractive for Russia, since the external part of this 
strategy identified the settlement of territorial 
disputes with neighboring countries on the basis of 
international cooperation and international law as a 
priority. Despite certain statements by Canadian 
politicians in the international arena about Russia’s 
aggressive actions in the Arctic and the need to 
resist this aggression, Canada is interested in 
delineating the disputed territories in the Arctic 
Ocean with Russia for the following reasons:  
1. There is only one territorial dispute 
between Canada and Russia – the Lomonosov 
Ridge, major submarine ridge with the width 
varying from 60 to 200 kilometers, stretching 
almost for 1800 kilometers from the Novosibirsk 
Islands across the North Pole to Ellesmere Island 
and is a giant “underwater bridge” connecting the 
mainland platforms of Asia and America. From a 
geological point of view, it is not entirely known 
whether it is an extension of the Eurasian or North 
American continental plate. For scientific research, 
heavy nuclear icebreakers of the “Yamal” type and 
the necessary underwater vehicles and drilling 
facilities are needed. These facilities, being able to 
work near the North Pole, are partially possessed 
only by Russia. Canada, for its part, has significant 
financial resources to conduct such research. 
Whatever it was, at a certain level, Canada stated, 
though not officially, that if for some reason it will 
not be possible to establish the geological 
affiliation of the Lomonosov Ridge, it is possible to 
proceed from the principle of equidistance from the 
North Pole. Thus, it is hinted that the Lomonosov 
Ridge can be divided based on the common 
average of its length or using the “sectoral 
principle”. In this connection, many experts note 
that the degree of contradictions between Canada 
and Russia on the division of the shelf in the 
Lomonosov Ridge is greatly exaggerated, and 
therefore, there is a possibility of compromise [7]. 
In doing so, a compromise can be reached by using 
or partially using the sectoral principle, which 
Canada has never formally abandoned. It is this 
circumstance that “brings together” Canada and 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 8, No.5, October 2019 
405 
Russia, as the use of the maritime delimitation in 
the Arctic Ocean, exclusively the rules of the 1982 
Law of the Sea, deprives both of significant 
territories, which means the loss of potentially large 
reserves of natural resources. Both countries are 
well aware of this and proceed from the maximum 
protection of their rights to the waters of the Arctic 
Ocean and coastal seas. Having huge borders in the 
Arctic and a long-term practice of dividing the 
Arctic territories according to the sectoral principle 
even in the “coldest” times of confrontation, 
Canada and Russia have all the chances and legal 
mechanisms to settle the territorial dispute in the 
Lomonosov Ridge with maximum benefit for both 
sides.  
2. Paradoxically, another point why Canada 
should cooperate with Russia on delimitation issues 
is that Russia can help Canada in its dispute with 
Denmark and the US. Canada disputes the 
ownership of a small (an area of only 1.3 square 
kilometers) uninhabited Hans Island and the 
boundary line in the Lincoln Sea with Denmark. In 
the US, Canada disputes the maritime boundary in 
the Beaufort Sea, namely the 6,250-nautical-mile 
expanse of the sea supposedly rich in oil and gas. 
Russia having a significant icebreaker fleet can 
provide these facilities to confirm Canadian claims 
in the dispute with Denmark and the United States. 
Currently, the concept of sectoral division of the 
Arctic space has not lost its relevance, although it is 
criticized primarily by the three Arctic countries of 
the United States, Denmark and partly Norway, 
thereby giving the sectoral principle the status of a 
normal rule.  In this part, it is important to draw 
attention to the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 [8], 
adopted in Ilulissat (Greenland) by the Arctic 
States, which enshrined the following intentions of 
the participating countries:  
By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the 
five coastal states are in a unique position to 
address these possibilities and challenges. In this 
regard, we recall that an extensive international 
legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as 
discussed between our representatives at the 
meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 October 2007 at the 
level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea 
provides for important rights and obligations 
concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom 
of navigation, marine scientific research, and other 
uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal 
framework and to the orderly settlement of any 
possible overlapping claims [9].  
Thus, Russia should build its strategy for the 
delimitation of the Arctic territories with Canada on 
the basis of customary international law – the 
sectoral principle with the possible partial 
application of the norms of the Convention of the 
United Nations in maritime law [in 10]. The benefit 
for applying this strategy for Russia can be seen in 
a positive international precedent when, in 2018, 
after 22 years of negotiations on the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea the Caspian countries carried out 
the delimitation of the disputed areas on the basis 
of the sectoral principle, with partial application of 
the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 1982 [11]. 
3.2. Denmark’s arctic strategy  
The Kingdom of Denmark is an Arctic state 
because of Greenland. Without Greenland, 
Denmark would have lost the ability to claim for 
the Arctic territories, as well as its resources. In 
1920, Denmark declared sovereignty over 
Greenland. “In 1933, when the Permanent Court of 
International Justice declared the legal status of 
Greenland in favor of Denmark [12], it referred to a 
note from the British Government, acting on behalf 
of Canada, which in 1920 assured the Danish 
Government that it recognized Danish sovereignty 
over Greenland” [13]. Denmark’s strategy in the 
Arctic does not have a long historical period. 
Conditionally, it began only when Denmark 
became a member of NATO. In those days, the 
whole policy of Denmark in relation to its Arctic 
territories was to ensure the security of Greenland 
together with the United States, which, with the 
consent of Denmark and Greenland, placed a 
military base there to monitor the Northern and 
Baltic fleet of the USSR. This was the main policy 
of Denmark until the early 2000s. At the beginning 
of the new Millennium, with other Arctic countries 
adopting doctrinal strategies for their Arctic 
territories, the Danish authorities began to think 
about a full-fledged strategy for their Arctic 
territories in general and for Greenland in 
particular. In August 2011 the Danish Government 
in agreement with the governments of Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands approved the Kingdom of 
Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 - 2020 [14]. 
This unusual tripartite format of the Danish 
strategy is associated with a significant level of 
autonomy for Greenland and the Faroe Islands in 
many matters, including those relating to the 
exploration and development of mineral resources. 
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One of the tasks of the document was to fix 
common goals and ensure coordination of actions 
in all three subjects of the Kingdom. In this regard, 
it is not surprising that the main mechanisms for 
the implementation of the strategy are the creation 
of a tripartite Steering Committee and the joint 
development of measures in the areas of foreign 
and security policy in relation to the Arctic. It 
should be noted that the main vector of the Danish 
Arctic Strategy, the object of the declared steps is 
Greenland, including provision of its economic 
growth, environmental protection of the island and 
adjacent waters, and promotion of the socio-
economic development of the indigenous 
population. This approach seems quite justified, 
since Greenland is Denmark’s “window” to the 
Arctic, a factor that allows the Kingdom to be 
ranked among the Arctic States. The strategy 
establishes the following measures as the main 
activities of Denmark:  
 Ensuring a peaceful, protected and safe 
Arctic (priority use of international law, 
strengthening the safety of navigation, the exercise 
of sovereign rights);  
 Achieving self-sustainable growth and 
development (application of the highest standards 
in field development, use of renewable energy 
sources, sustainable exploitation of bio resources, 
growth and development based on scientific data, 
active involvement in international trade);  
 Promoting development with respect for 
the climate, environment and nature of the Arctic 
(increasing knowledge about the effects of climate 
change, protecting the natural environment and 
biodiversity);  
 Providing close international cooperation 
with foreign partners (search for global solutions to 
global challenges, expansion of regional 
cooperation, ensuring national interests on a 
bilateral basis).  
Denmark intends to achieve the goals set in the 
strategy both through national measures (closer 
cooperation on the Arctic issues with Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands, continuation of scientific 
research in the Arctic, strengthening of its 
sovereignty and control in the national maritime 
and continental areas), and mainly through the 
active promotion of its positions in international 
organizations (the UN, the European Union, the 
Arctic Council, the International Maritime 
Organization, the Nordic Council of Ministers), in 
the context of bilateral relations with the United 
States, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Russia. 
Meanwhile, currently, Denmark is actually 
implementing only the following directions of the 
stated main directions in the strategy:  
1. Ensuring the socio-economic development 
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands; 
2. Protection of the Arctic ecology.  
There were essentially no territorial disputes 
between Denmark and Russia until 2014. However, 
in 2014, Denmark applied to the UN Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to recognize 
a significant part of the Arctic shelf as belonging to 
Greenland. The area of the territorial claims is 
about 895 thousand square kilometers; this is 20 
times the size of Denmark and includes the North 
Pole and the entire Lomonosov Ridge [15]. Unlike 
previous applications, the foreign policy initiative 
of 2014 became more ambitious for the Danes – the 
country claims strategically and symbolically 
important territories. This application adds a new 
dispute with Russia over the Lomonosov Ridge and 
adds a dispute with Canada to the existing Danish 
territorial disputes. Denmark refused Russia’s 
proposals to start negotiations, pointing out that it 
was necessary to wait for the position of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
As stated by a number of Danish politicians, 
Denmark currently is not interested in bilateral 
talks with Russia about partial overlapping of 
territorial claims of both countries near the North 
Pole, so as to negotiate it is necessary that experts 
of the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf have tested these territorial 
claims [16, 26].  But for Russia, the Danish strategy 
in general is acceptable for solving a number of 
issues related to the Arctic in general and 
delimitation in particular. Taking into account 
Denmark’s commitment to international norms and 
organizations in solving its problems, Denmark has 
developed a policy and fully supports it for many 
years, that is, the internationalization of the Arctic 
and the exclusive application of the norms of the 
1982UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
including in solving issues on the territory 
delimitation between the Arctic countries. Denmark 
reaffirmed this position in its strategy by adhering 
to the provisions of the Ilulissat Declaration dated 
May 28, 2008. According to this Declaration, any 
possible overlapping claims in respect of the 
continental shelf will be resolved exclusively on the 
basis of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Based on the above circumstances, Russia’s 
position in bilateral negotiations on the territory 
delimitation in the Arctic should be based on the 
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application of the Law of the Sea, avoiding the 
emphasis on the sectoral principle. This approach 
will allow Russia to find a mutually acceptable 
solution without prejudice to its interests, and 
enable Denmark to settle the territorial dispute in 
accordance with the stated objectives – any 
disputes must be resolved through negotiations. In 
general, the political will expressed in the Danish 
Arctic Strategy – to promote stable and conflict-
free development of the situation in the Arctic – 
forms a favorable background for increasing 
bilateral Russian-Danish cooperation in many 
areas: from political and economic to social and 
scientific ones. The task is to proactively use the 
opportunities for mutual benefit and cooperation, 
translate them into practical actions and concrete 
agreements. 
3.3. Norway’s arctic strategy 
Norway did not have a clearly formulated Arctic 
Strategy for a long time, although its basis 
originated at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries. At 
that time, the great Norwegian explorers left their 
names in the history of Arctic exploration: F. 
Nansen’s expedition in 1893-1896 to explore the 
Central part of the Arctic Ocean; O. Sverdrup’s 
expedition in 1898-1902 to explore the Canadian 
Arctic archipelago. The Arctic Policy of Norway is 
fully reflected in the Old Norse meaning of its 
name – “the way to the North”.  By “Northern 
areas” Norway means the vast expanses, both 
geographically and politically, comprising parts of 
land and sea, individual islands and groups of 
islands, which extend to the North from Sør-
Helgeland and to the East from the Greenland Sea 
to the Barents and Pechora Seas. In political terms, 
these areas include the administrative units of 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, which are 
united by the Barents Cooperation, the EU Member 
States within the “Northern Dimension”, as well as 
the Arctic spaces of the United States and Canada 
within the Arctic Council [17]. Currently, the 
Norwegian government policy has a pronounced 
“northern” vector. In December 2006, Norway 
submitted the statement of the borders of the shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and so far 
Norway’s statement is the only one of the Arctic 
countries that has been approved by the 
Commission. Norway’s Arctic strategy was 
presented in December 2006. The overall objective 
of this document was to create a sustainable growth 
and development of the Arctic region on the basis 
of three principles: presence, activity and 
knowledge. The strategy also outlined seven major 
policy priorities for Norway: 
 To implement a stable, consistent and 
predictable Arctic policy; 
 to take a leading role in international 
efforts to develop the Arctic region; 
 to achieve the best parameters in the 
interaction with the environment and natural 
resources of the Arctic; 
 to provide an appropriate basis for further 
development of oil activities; 
 to protect the livelihoods, traditions and 
culture of indigenous peoples and promote 
cooperation between them and the state; 
 to strengthen cooperation with the Russian 
Federation. 
The Arctic region is a top priority for both 
domestic and foreign policy in Norway. The 
government allocates huge funds for projects in the 
Far North. Norway’s updated strategy Norway’s 
Arctic Strategy – between geopolitics and social 
development was adopted in April 2017. The main 
goal declared by the government is to make the 
northern territories of Norway the most innovative 
and sustainable regions in the country in the 
coming years. This document established five 
priority areas:  
1. International cooperation;  
2. Business development;  
3. Knowledge development;  
4. Infrastructure; 
5. Environmental protection and emergency 
preparedness. 
Unlike the rest of the Arctic countries, Norway has 
fully settled the existing territorial dispute with 
Russia. 
For example, since 1970 there has been a territorial 
dispute over the border between the States in the 
Barents Sea. Its essence tended to revolve around 
the fact that Russia drew the border along the coast 
of Spitsbergen; Norway believed that the border 
should be equidistant from Spitsbergen, on the one 
hand, and the Land of Franz Josef and Novaya 
Zemlya, on the other hand. Since the States were on 
friendly terms, the dispute over the border rarely 
resulted in any actions, and Russian fishing vessels 
were occasionally detained. However, the dispute 
escalated further, as hydrocarbon reserves were 
discovered in the Barents Sea, including in the 
disputed waters.  In April 2010, the parties agreed 
that the new delimitation line would divide the 
disputed water area into two equal parts. On 
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September 15, 2010, Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg signed the Treaty concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean. The absence of territorial 
disputes does not mean that the Parties can now 
“run away” in any direction. The Arctic, as a region 
rich in hydrocarbon deposits, bio resources and 
potential attractive sea routes, requires both 
countries to deepen mutual cooperation in the 
Arctic. Thus, cooperation with Russia also remains 
among the key topics in Norway’s Arctic Strategy 
for 2017. As stated in Norway’s Arctic Strategy – 
between geopolitics and social development, 
“Despite Russia’s violations of international law in 
Ukraine and Norway’s response to these, it is vital 
that Norway and Russia work together to address 
key challenges in the north. Our relations with 
Russia will remain a constant and important 
element of Norway’s Arctic policy. Norway wants 
to have good neighborly relations with Russia, and 
the Government gives high priority to dialogue 
with the Russian authorities” [18]. Russia is 
certainly interested in deepening cooperation with 
Norway not only in the field of hydrocarbon 
production, but also in fishing, conservation of 
biological resources and ecology of the Arctic 
waters, etc. 
3.4. U.S. strategy in the arctic  
The United States did not have a separate Arctic 
Strategy until the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. During the entire period of the 20th 
century, the Arctic was considered in the context of 
national security, and until the end of the 20th 
century only from a military point of view. The 
foundations of modern Arctic Policy of the United 
States were defined in the Presidential Decision 
Directive of W. Clinton in 1994 [19]. 
The document set six principal objectives in the 
Arctic region:  
(1) Meeting post-Cold War national security and 
defense needs,  
(2) Protecting the Arctic environment and 
conserving its biological resources,  
(3) Assuring that natural resource management and 
economic development in the region are 
environmentally sustainable,  
(4) Strengthening institutions for cooperation 
among the eight Arctic nations,  
(5) Involving the Arctic's indigenous peoples in 
decisions that affect them, and  
(6) Enhancing scientific monitoring and research 
into local, regional and global environmental issues 
[20].  
The revision of the US interests and policy in the 
Arctic begins after 2004 in connection with the 
revival of Russia’s activities in the Far North and 
the Arctic. National Security Presidential Directive 
on the Arctic Region Policy of the United States 
was published on January 2, 2009. It states that 
“the United States has broad and fundamental 
national security interests in the Arctic region and 
is prepared to operate either independently or in 
conjunction with other states to safeguard these 
interests” [21]. This document totally confirmed the 
priorities laid down in the 1994 Presidential 
Decision Directive, describing in more detail 
certain areas of policy. In particular, the document 
consolidated the US standpoint on the regime of an 
international governance of the region, according to 
which, with the increase in the economic activity in 
the Arctic, it becomes necessary to raise the issue 
of developing new international legal instruments 
regulating existinf arrangements. However, 
Washington sees no need to create a comprehensive 
legal instrument like the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.  
Washington benefits from the maximum 
implementation of the principle of freedom of 
navigation and economic activity in the Arctic, 
since the United States does not participate in the 
UN conventions on the Law of the Sea, enabling to 
file a claim in disputes over the division of the 
shelf.  
Declared officially American interests can be 
grouped into several categories: 
 Military strategic interests – missile 
defense and early warning, deployment of sea and 
air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, 
maritime presence, and maritime security 
operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and 
overflight. The US is ready to act unilaterally, if 
necessary, to protect these interests.  
 Homeland security interests – preventing 
terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or 
hostile acts that could increase the United States 
vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.  
 Political and economic interests – 
expanding the US economic presence while 
demonstrating maritime power. The United States 
intends not only to protect its rights in the exclusive 
economic zone (200 miles offshore), but also to 
exercise “proper control” over the adjacent waters. 
Freedom of transarctic flights and freedom of 
navigation with regard to the entire Arctic, 
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including the Northern Sea Route, which runs 
along the territory of Russia, are also named the 
highest national priority [21]. 
The USA considers the Arctic Council to be the 
main platform for discussing Arctic problems, 
appreciating its contribution to achieving 
sustainable development goals and protecting the 
interests of the indigenous population of the region. 
At the same time, the Americans see the Council 
only as a high-level regional forum and oppose 
giving it the status of an international organization. 
This is because Washington fears that the Council 
will be given the authority to make binding 
decisions that could run counter to state policy. The 
priority of the United States in the Arctic is to 
ensure military strategic superiority and the 
possibility of free and operational maneuvering of 
the Navy. The 2009Directive named freedom of 
navigation as the national interest Number One in 
the region. This dictates the position of the 
Americans on the legal status of the Northern Sea 
Route and the Northwest Passage: Washington 
considers them international straits in which the 
right of transit passage operates, and the coastal 
States (Russia and Canada, respectively) cannot 
infringe this right by their national legislation. The 
importance of freedom of navigation for the United 
States is growing due to the accelerated melting of 
the Arctic ice and the emergence of new transport 
opportunities, as a result. The prospects for the 
Americans to extend their jurisdiction to the 
extended continental shelf (i.e. to the shelf areas 
beyond 200 nautical miles offshore) remain 
unclear. The 2009Directive determined that 
defining the seabed boundaries on which the state 
will have sovereign rights to extract marine 
resources is a key direction to ensure the energy 
and environmental security of the country. 
Therefore, the United States reserves the right to 
act not only unilaterally, but also to exercise control 
over the Arctic beyond the legally justified dividing 
lines in the Arctic Strategy. The work on the 
implementation of the US strategic interests in the 
Arctic, set out in the documents of 1994 and 2009, 
was continued by Obama’s administration.  Only 
the accents have changed in the politics. Thus, the 
US National Strategy for the Arctic Region adopted 
in 2013 sets the task of raising public awareness 
about the Arctic problems, primarily environmental 
ones. Obama’s visit to Alaska in September 2015 
was, in particular, aimed at drawing the attention of 
the population to the issues of climate change and 
environmental protection of the North. In addition, 
the US President achieved significant political 
dividends on the climate agenda in December 2016 
where the issuance of licenses for the development 
of oil and gas fields in the waters of the Chukchi 
Sea and the Beaufort Sea was banned. It seems that 
the overall strategic course of the United States in 
the Arctic, planned at the end of the 20th century, 
will continue. An indirect confirmation of the 
continuity of the current US Arctic policy is the 
fact that almost all key employees of the State 
Department that are responsible for the 
implementation of the US policy in the Arctic 
under the Obama administration, retained their 
seats under current President Donald Trump. In this 
regard, the opinion of one of such high-ranking 
officials D. Bolton, who holds the post of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for oceans and fisheries 
and concurrently Chairman of the Committee of 
senior officials of the Arctic Council, deserves 
attention. At a press conference at the end of the 
Council meeting in Juneau (Alaska) on March 10, 
2017, David Balton, who has worked for more than 
30 years in the Foreign Ministry, noted that the US 
course in the Arctic had undergone minimum 
changes over the years. According to him, the goals 
of the state in the region were unchanged and based 
primarily on the socio-economic interests of Alaska 
and the need to ensure the environmental security 
of the region. D. Balton suggested that this 
situation would not change in the coming years 
[22]. Due to the absence of the current US policy 
concerning the Arctic, the US non-participation in 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
the available common tensions in bilateral relations 
and the fact that the US does not support the 
sectoral principle force Russia not to hurry with the 
choice of a certain method for conducting bilateral 
negotiations. The current US foreign policy does 
not have permanence, unity and compliance with 
the previous commitments.  In these circumstances, 
Russia needs to focus its activities on the territory 




In our opinion, having considered the positions of 
each Arctic country in the context of the territory 
delimitation in the Arctic and the emerging 
problems in dispute settlement on the basis of 
existing normative legal acts of international law, it 
will be very important that Russia’s strategy for the 
delimitation of the Arctic territories is combined, 
since the diversity of problems and contradictions 
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do not allow Russia to proceed from only one plane 
in solving problematic issues on the Arctic in 
general and on the territory delimitation in the 
Arctic in particular. In general, the solution of this 
problem should be based on such factors as:  
- Geological difficulties in studying the bottom of 
the Arctic Ocean; 
- Methods and techniques of the Arctic countries 
for the territory delimitation and their relationship 
with each other; 
- Certain conflicts in the norms of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in attempts to 
apply its rules for the territory delimitation in the 
Arctic; 
- The lengthy nature of considering the 
controversial issues in the international bodies. 
The authors of this article would like to note once 
again that it is necessary to understand that the 
solution of delimitation issues should not be 
regarded as something separate, independent and 
unrelated to other problems in the Arctic. On the 
contrary, the Arctic countries, which have 
territorial disputes among themselves, have to settle 
them in the complex by solving other issues. It is 
important to understand the strategies of the Arctic 
countries in this context, what their goals are and 
what underlies their strategies. In this regard, the 
Russian approach in solving territorial disputes 
with its Arctic neighboring countries needs to be 
integrated and multifaceted, that is, the delimitation 
should be considered in the context of other issues, 
such as economic cooperation, joint actions, 
ecological safety, etc [26]. The combined approach 
and the integrated solution enabled the five Caspian 
countries to define in 2018 the legal regime of the 
Caspian Sea and to delimit the disputed waters 
using both the customary norms of international 
law and the norms of the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.  At the same time, Russia’s 
strategy in relation to bilateral formats with other 
Arctic countries should be based on the historical 
relations between them and the current policy 
pursued by these countries. Therefore, we believe 
that Russia should build its strategy on the 
delimitation of the Arctic territories on the basis of 
customary international law – the sectoral principle 
with the possible partial application of the 
provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea for Canada, and in respect of Denmark, 
Russia should apply the opposite strategy – the 
rules of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. These relations should form the basis of 
bilateral negotiations on the territory delimitation in 
the Arctic. And such a strategy should be pursued 
not only in relation to Canada and Denmark, but 
also in relation to Norway and the United States. In 
any case, integrated cooperation will give at least 
some positive result or a way to solve the problems 
associated with the delimitation in the Arctic. In 
this connection, it is impossible to apply a single 
method or methods to resolve territorial disputes, 
and to consider territorial disputes themselves 
outside of other problems that require mutual 
solutions. Only in this case, it is possible to achieve 
success in the peaceful settlement of the issue and 
further cooperation in one of the most important 
parts of the world for humanity, such as the Arctic. 
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